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The Westray Mine Incident: Corporate Violence and
Governmental Crime as the Roots of Disaster
Melissa Hughes
Western University

Abstract
This paper addresses the catastrophic Westray mine disaster that rocked the East Coast of
Canada in Plymouth, Nova Scotia, in May 1992 and outlines the causes and factors of the deadly
explosion that resulted in the death of 26 miners. From a perspective of white-collar crime,
particularly governmental crime and corporate violence, this paper asserts that the negligent
actions of inspectors from the Nova Scotia Department of Labour and managers from Curragh
Resources Inc., the corporation in charge of the Westray mining operation, led to the conditions
in the mine that caused the explosion to occur. Despite there being no convictions in the
criminal trial that followed the disaster, the report from the Westray Mining Inquiry clearly
indicates numerous incidences in which the failure of Curragh managers to implement provincial
health and safety regulations created an unsafe work environment for the Westray miners, and
because of which a methane explosion was only a matter of time. A comprehensive analysis of
the disaster, including theoretical explanations for the negligent actions of government inspectors
and mine managers and the structural conditions that may have contributed to a criminogenic
environment within the agency and corporation is also included, followed by an analysis of
legislation that has been enacted by the Canadian government in the aftermath of this event.
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criminal negligence – governmental crime – corporate violence – criminogenic – Westray bill
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Introduction
While the workplace may generally be thought of as an area in which workers’ rights are
protected and their well being ensured, a myriad of cases demonstrate that in fact the workplace
can be the site of dangerous practices and safety omissions that threaten not only the health of
workers, but also their lives (Payne, 2012, p. 356). Failing to implement safety regulations can
cause physically harmful, if not deadly circumstances for workers, and the negligence exercised
in the omission of such regulations can be accurately purported as being acts of white-collar
crime. Frank and Lynch have expanded upon Edward Sutherland’s (1941) definition of whitecollar crime, and conceptualized these crimes as “socially injurious and blameworthy acts
committed by individuals or groups of individuals who occupy decision-making positions in
corporations or businesses”; these acts are committed for the benefit of said individuals against
the corporation or business for which they are employed (Frank and Lynch, 1992, p. 17). The
concept of white-collar crime has been typified in many ways, now having many different facets.
The Westray mine disaster provides for an analysis of governmental crime and corporate
violence in the negligent actions of the Nova Scotia Department of Labour, which is a
department of the provincial government, and Curragh Resources Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
“Curragh”), the corporation that operated the Westray mine at the time of the disaster (Fthenos,
2014; Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 16). Together, the acts of negligence of the Department of
Labour inspectors and Curragh managers in failing to properly enforce and comply with
provincial health and safety regulations arguably contributed to the death of 26 Westray miners
(Bittle, 2012, p. 5). Despite neither the Nova Scotia government nor employees of Curragh
being formally convicted as responsible for the deaths of the Westray miners, this paper argues
that the extent of negligence executed by both the government and Curragh employees
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demonstrates a unique synthesis of governmental and corporate crime, wherein the disregard for
existing safety regulations, on the part of both actors (in the pursuit of economic growth for the
province, and in profits for the corporation) contributed to the explosion.
The Event and Resulting Harm
Tragedy rocked Canada’s East Coast on the fateful morning of May 9, 1992. Located in
Plymouth, Nova Scotia, the Westray mine was the site of a deadly underground explosion that
tore through its southwest section and killed all 26 miners who were working in it (Hynes and
Prasad, 1997, p. 608). In the aftermath of the explosion, frantic relatives waited as emergency
rescue personnel searched the mine, becoming decreasingly hopeful that survivors would be
found throughout the duration of the search. The ten-day search and rescue operation resulted in
the retrieval of the bodies of only fifteen men, the remaining eleven never being found before the
termination of the rescue process (Davis and Verberg, 2011, p. 31; Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993,
p. 14).
The Nova Scotia government acted immediately to investigate the particulars of the
explosion. Within five days of the deadly event, the Premier appointed Justice Richard to launch
a public inquiry into the disaster (McMullan, 2007, p. 21). Five years later, in 1997, the Westray
Mining Inquiry report was published, importantly titled “The Westray Story: A Predictable Path
to Disaster” (Bittle, 2012, p. 5). The report confirms that the head of a continuous mining
machine caught spark, igniting methane gas and producing a large flame that traveled through
the mine, leaving behind a noxious stream of carbon monoxide as it used up all of the oxygen in
its path (McClung and McMullan, 2006, p. 67). The fire continued to grow in size as it ravished
through the mine, and it quickly erupted into a methane explosion, which subsequently caused
the coal dust located on the floor of the mine to explode; the combined forces of these explosions
4

	
  

blew off the entire mine entrance, located one mile above the blast center (McClung and
McMullan, 2006, p. 67). The blast was so powerful that houses in nearby communities felt their
shock, as homeowners reported their houses shaking and windows breaking at the time of the
explosion (Bittle, 2012, p. 4). The sheer magnitude of the explosion, causing a collapse of the
mine itself, along with the poisonous gases suffocating the breathable air in the mine, ensured
that no workers could possibly survive, and that all were probably killed immediately (McClung
and McMullan, 2006, p. 67).
The Legal Response
In the aftermath of the Westray mine disaster, extensive investigative measures were
undertaken and allegations of corporate wrongdoing shortly hit the media waves and infiltrated
the Canadian legal system. The report of the public inquiry takes numerous shots against both
Curragh and the Department of Labour, citing the deaths as the unfortunate result of greed and
expedience (McMullan, 2007, p. 40). Indeed, plentiful accusations against Curragh and the
government were expressed, the Westray incident repeatedly being referred to as “a disaster
waiting to happen” through a combination of missteps and oversights (Davis and Verberg, 2011,
p. 24). The Department of Labour initiated its own internal investigation, and the RCMP
launched a criminal investigation (McMullan, 2007, p. 21).
Although Curragh tried tirelessly to manage the media’s accounting of the Westray
disaster, this task became impossible as information was continuously released suggesting that
numerous systematic failures triggered the explosion (Tucker, 1995, p. 92). Curragh adopted an
“accident narrative” in defending itself against accusations of negligence and corporate
wrongdoing, suggesting the explosion was random and unavoidable, and that “mother nature
cannot always be predicted or controlled” (Davis and Verberg, 2011, p. 29). Furthermore, the
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government explicitly rejected any responsibility for the incident, and insisted upon blaming the
miners themselves as being liable for their own deaths (McMullan, 2007, p. 36). In the interim
of publication of the report, various regulatory agencies filed 52 violations of the Occupational
Health and Safety Act against Curragh (McClung and McMullan, 2006, p. 68). These charges
dealt with fifteen separate components of the operation of the mine and included severe
allegations of encroachments of safety codes; however, all 52 charges were quickly dropped in
order to avoid the abrogation of the right to a fair trial of anyone later charged criminally by the
RCMP (Hynes and Prasad, 1997, p. 609). In 1993, as a result of its criminal investigation, the
RCMP did charge Currgah, as well as two of its managers – Gerald Phillips, the former manager
of the mine, and Roger Parry, the former underground manager – with manslaughter and
criminal negligence (Gomery, 2006 p. 790; Tucker, 1995, p. 92-93).
The road to conviction was not an easy one, and much debate circulated throughout the
course of the trial regarding who was to blame for the disaster. The trial began in February 1995,
and cost approximately $4.5 million to execute (McClung and McMullan, 200c6, p. 68 and
Tucker, 1995, p. 93). Bittle (2012) points to “prosecutorial mishaps” as partially contributing to
the failure of convictions against the accused (p. 4). McMullan (2007) further supports Bittle’s
claim by citing numerous state failures in the legal realm, including an incomplete police
investigation resulting in inaccurate evidence to be presented at trial and a state prosecution that
was explicitly denied the appropriate resources and legal expertise to present a sound criminal
case (p. 36). Additionally, the difficulty in convicting the Curragh managers was partly due to a
lack of legislation holding employees in a supervisory role criminally responsible for
disregarding safety warnings (Johnson, 2008, p. 355).
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In the end, no convictions were laid against Curragh Resources Inc., nor Phillips or Parry,
as the charges of manslaughter and criminal negligence could not be proven (Johnson, 2008, p.
355). The Crown stayed proceedings due to an apparent lack of evidence to proceed with the
trial, despite the four volume Westray Mining Iquiry report that detailed numerous incidences of
managerial missteps and regulatory violations (McGillivray, 2004, p. 39). Civil actions against
the Department of Labour were also not pursued in full, as the Supreme Court of Canada decided
that the Nova Scotia government could not be held responsible for the deaths at the mine despite
its negligence in licensing and directing a mining business it knew to be unsafe (McClung and
McMullan, 2006, p. 68). The Nova Scotia Workers’ Compensation Board paid an estimated $15
million to the families of the deceased miners, which has done little to satisfy them as they
remain disappointed that no criminal convictions were reached (Tucker, 1995, p. 93).
Rationale for Topic Selection
The negligence exercised by Curragh managers and by inspectors from the Department of
Labour constitute corporate crime, specifically corporate violence, by the former and
governmental crime by the latter, as typified by various scholars (Frank and Lynch, 1992;
Kramer, 1984; Payne, 2012). Frank and Lynch (1992) conceptualize “corporate violence” as a
facet of corporate crime, including those acts that are “socially injurious and
blameworthy…committed by corporations and businesses against their workers…that cause
physical injury to workers…” (p. 17). As with corporate crime, the benefactor of corporate
violence is the corporation itself (Frank and Lynch, 1992, p. 17). In this regard, the concept of
white-collar crime becomes extended to include violations of regulatory law, as the willful
violation of health and safety regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act by
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managerial employees of Curragh undoubtedly contributed to the deaths of the 26 miners on that
fateful morning (Hochstetler and Shover, 2002, p. 2; Payne, 2012, p. 40).
The public inquiry also indicates wrongdoing on the part of the Department of Labour in
allowing this mining enterprise to continue operating despite knowing the dangerous conditions
of the mine (McClung and McMullan, 2006, p. 68). Since the Department of Labour is an
agency of the Nova Scotia government, the actions of the Department of Labour should be
considered a form of governmental crime (Fthenos, 2014). As inspectors of the Department of
Labour arguably carried out negligent actions, it is appropriate to delineate these actions as a
form of white-collar crime (Fthenos, 2014). This section of the paper will outline the crucial
findings of the Westray Mining Inquiry that indicate numerous incidences of negligence on the
part of Curragh managers, as well as by inspectors of the Department of Labour, to support the
claim that acts of corporate violence and governmental crime respectively were committed.
Particular factors will also be considered in terms of their influence on the economic and
political climate in which the Westray mine was constructed and operated, which may have had
an influence on decisions made by the corporation and by the government.
The Westray Mining Inquiry report, as well as other special reports that consolidate its
findings, provide a detailed timeline of safety omissions and red flags leading up to the disaster
that, if properly attended to by the Nova Scotia government and addressed by managers at
Curragh, could have quite possibly prevented the explosion. In December 1987, Curragh
Resources Inc. purchased Suncor’s interests in the Pictou coalfield of Nova Scotia, after
completing its feasibility study of the area the preceding month (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p.
16). Unfortunately, while the provincial government enjoys jurisdiction over mine safety,
hopeful mine operators do not need the permission of the government to develop a mine;
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Curragh therefore did not have to clear their decision to mine with the provincial government,
thus avoiding any legal obligation to consider the health and safety of workers when determining
whether or not to mine (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 17).
Arguably, this lack of governmental control over the decisions of a private corporation
has its roots in a system that favors the creation of private wealth over government intervention
in the economy (Tucker, 1995, p. 99). Herein lies a crucial cultural factor that may have
contributed to the oversight on the government’s part in not considering fully the potentially
dangerous consequences that could arise out of building a mine in this particular coalfield. The
existence of geological faults leading to the potentially dangerous roof and floor conditions of
any mine that is built, the “dangerous presence of methane”, and the capability of spontaneous
combustion were cited in a 1987 feasibility report undertaken by Placer Development Ltd.
(Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 16). Indeed, while numerous feasibility studies were conducted
by various agencies – including the Canada Centre for Mineral and Mining Technology, an
institution of the federal government – the noted dangerous conditions of the Pictou coalfield
were never seen as an issue for worker health and safety, but rather as problems of technical and
economic feasibility (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 16). This suggests that neither government
agencies nor Curragh considered seriously the potential dangers to the health and safety of
miners, further implying that the political view at the time was more concerned with the value of
coal and money than that of human life (Tucker, 1995, p. 101). The political economy of Nova
Scotia at the time of the development of the Westray mine contributed to the unsafe work
conditions that led to the disaster in this regard (Ross, 2001, p. 79).
An additional structural issue was present in terms of the time crunch that Curragh was
placed under to complete the construction of the mine once the decision to start the Westray
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project was confirmed. While construction of the mine began in April 1989, it became delayed
until 1990 due to a lack of financial backing from the federal government; this delay made it
more difficult for construction to be complete by September 1991, the date by which the first
order of Westray coal was to be delivered to Curragh’s first customers (Glasbeek and Tucker,
1993, p. 21). It has been suggested that the pressure to build the mine within this shorter period
of time was linked to safety issues (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 21).
The Westray Mining Inquiry report produced further evidence of corporate wrongdoing
with respect to the failure of Curragh managers to address violations of safety regulations that
were brought to their attention by the Department of Labour while the mine was in operation.
The report indicates more than 50 incidences of which the managers of the Westray mine were
warned about violations of workplace health and safety regulations, and that all 50 warnings
were effectively ignored by Curragh (Bittle and Snider, 2011, p. 375). Perhaps most
importantly, the managers of the Westray mine had been warned intermittently about the level of
methane concentration in the air in the mine as well as the dangerous levels of coal dust on its
floor (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 22). Department of Labour inspectors had repeatedly
reminded the Westray management team that as a legal precaution, limestone dust must be
placed on the bottom of the mine floor to cover the vast amount of coal dust present – during the
construction of the mine, between February and April 1991, they pointed out the need for more
limestone on approximately nine occasions (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 22). After a cave-in
at the mine in May 1992, ministry officials conducted an investigation at Westray and noticed
that the air sample taken in the mine was four percent methane, coming extremely close to the
threshold for disaster, as methane gas explodes if ignited when it reaches a five percent
concentration in the air (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 22).
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Production in the mine was not halted on either of these occasions; the Nova Scotia
Department of Labour felt satisfied that the Westray mine managers had developed a coal dust
plan to be enforced by the end of September 1991, and that they were effectively controlling the
methane situation (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 22). However, in April 1992 it was clear that
Westray had not been taking the appropriate steps to eliminate the dangers as identified by the
Department of Labour. Ten days before the explosion, on April 29, a Department of Labour
inspector served the Curragh management with a written direction to clean up the mine site in
order to prevent a coal dust explosion within fourteen days, or risk prosecution (Bittle, 2012, p.
5; Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 22). Unfortunately, the order did not have a chance to expire
before inspectors could take action, with the explosion occurring due to the high levels of coal
dust (Bittle, 2012, p. 5). A special report of the disaster uncovered numerous occasions on which
managers at Curragh could have taken action to make the Westray mine a safer work
environment for its miners, and these officially recorded health and safety violations make it
clear that these violations preceded the disaster (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 22).
While the display of Curragh’s indifference towards numerous safety warnings since the
beginning of the construction of the mine have been cited in the allegations of negligence and
manslaughter against the corporation, the Nova Scotia Department of Labour must also be
considered as having some responsibility for the deaths of the miners. While the provincial
government did not have to give permission to Curragh to begin the mining process in the Pictou
coalfield, the government is necessarily given notice when a company begins work on a new
mine, and from that point on, the Department of Labour is charged with the responsibility to
ensure that mine operations are conducted in a manner consistent with provincial health and
safety laws (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 17). Serious deficiencies in the management
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practices and operational methods of the Nova Scotia Department of Labour were found in an
investigation conducted on behalf of the Auditor General (Tucker, 1995, p. 93). In particular,
although the Department of Labour sent inspectors on numerous occasions to the Westray mine
and issued orders to Curragh to enact changes to make the mine safer, the Department of Labour
did nothing within its power to ensure compliance with these orders (Wicks, 2001, p. 674).
Inspectors did not ever shut down the mine during construction or while miners were working
despite their recognition of unsafe working conditions, nor did they conduct follow-up visits to
the mine after issuing orders to confirm that Curragh was complying with provisions of their
orders (Wicks, 2001, p. 674). The Department of Labour inspectors did not utilize their
authority over the Curragh managers in terms of enforcing provisions of the Occupational
Health and Safety Act, and instead were just as negligent as Curragh managers in allowing the
commission of safety code violations to continue, unhalted.
Theoretical Explanations
When analyzing the purported wrongdoings committed by individuals within a
corporation or government agency, it is necessary to do so through a theoretical lens to further
explain any factors that might exist within the organizational and bureaucratic structure of the
corporation that encouraged the commission of injurious behavior. James Coleman’s notion of
the “culture of competition” as facilitated by the rise of industrial capitalism situates itself nicely
in the case of the Westray mine disaster (Coleman, 1987, p. 416). Coleman states that economic
struggle is characteristic of life in capitalist society, and “the pursuit of economic self-interest” is
seen as a positive activity through which individual actors (or corporations) seek to surpass their
competitors in the accretion of wealth (1987, p. 416). Coleman’s theory can be accurately
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applied to the Westray case in terms of explaining the existence of cultural and economic
pressures and the resulting actions of Curragh employees.
From its very first days of operations, the mine had trouble meeting the production quotas
as set out by Nova Scotia Power, as per its fifteen-year contract with this entity; this threatened
the continued contribution of Nova Scotia Power’s financial resources to Curragh for future
development operations (Hynes and Prasad, 1997, p. 608). There were many violations of
safety regulations by Curragh that may be explained by the need to enhance coal production,
such as making adjustments to methanometers to keep equipment working when high levels of
methane would have otherwise caused it to shut off (Hynes and Prasad, 1997, p. 608).
Additional documents uncovered by the Westray Mining Inquiry indicate that the financial
situation for Westray worsened over time, which led to the eventual disregard of safety
regulations altogether for fear of jeopardizing the relationships between Curragh and its best
customers and lending institutions (Hynes and Prasad, 1997, p. 610).
In a similar manner to that of Coleman, Gephart (1984) suggests that corporate managers,
in acting as “agents of capital”, interpret production requirements as more important than safety
requirements (p. 213). Furthermore, corporations situated within the context of a culture of
competition and acting as agents of capital are less likely to meaningfully assess the physical
risks of organizational members, which may be enhanced further through the prioritization of
production over safety (Hynes and Prasad, 1997, p. 613). In combining the theory of Coleman
with other supporting theoretical perspectives surrounding the influence of capitalism on
corporate actions, the safety omissions on the part of Curragh can be explained in a more
comprehensive manner, taking into account not only individual actions of its managers but the
systemic pressures that exist in the broader social system to justify such omissions.
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Furthermore, Vaughan’s theory of organizational offending can be used as a framework
for analyzing the misconduct of both Curragh employees and inspectors from the Department of
Labour (Payne, 2012, p. 461; Vaughan, 1992). Understanding wrongdoing on the part of
corporate actors during the course of their occupational activities depends upon linking
“individual choice and the structural determinants of those choices” (Payne, 2012, p. 461).
According to this theory, there are three features of this link between individuals and the
organizational context in which they work that promote misconduct in the organization:
organizational processes that provide opportunities for misconduct, a competitive environment
that encourages the violation of organizational regulations, and a relationship with regulators that
diminishes the probability of prosecution (Payne, 2012, p. 461; Vaughan, 1992, p. 125).
Arguably, all three of these features were present within the organizational structure of
Curragh Resources Inc. preceding the disaster. In terms of organizational processes within
Curragh, the bureaucratic structure of the corporation created a situation in which miners were
essentially powerless against the tyranny of the managerial staff; the fact that the miners were
not unionized meant they lacked a concerted voice with which to address safety concerns (Hynes
and Prasad, 1996, p. 614). Moreover, Westray possessed a health and safety policy that
prevented workers from speaking about problems within the mine to anyone not employed at the
mine – such as mine inspectors – a policy that, in fact, directly violated the Occupational Health
and Safety Act (Hynes and Prasad, 1996, p. 612). As previously explained through the theories
of Coleman (1987) and Gephart (1984), the competitive capitalist environment provided
incentive for the violation of workplace safety regulations in exchange for economic prosperity
in the form of increased coal production. The processes and policies within Curragh Resources
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Inc. arguably suppressed the contention of workers to unsafe working conditions, thus
facilitating misconduct to occur without many barriers.
Finally, there has been evidence unearthed to suggest that Westray enjoyed a
“particularly cozy relationship” with Nova Scotia’s politicians, due to the dependence of the
province on the mine for improving the region’s general economic well-being (Glasbeek and
Tucker, 1993, p. 26). Important politicians under the auspice of the Premier and the federal
Minister of Public Works provided Westray with federal and provincial funding, as well as with
their own political capital (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p. 26). Furthermore, it can be purported
that provincial government involvement with the mine owner occurred through the offering of
political favouritism and guaranteeing public loans and tax incentives in exchange for high coal
extraction, and at the expense of the enforcement of safety regulations (McMullan, 2007, p. 36).
While these allegations are supported only by circumstantial evidence, the possibility that the
Westray project was viewed so fondly by the government bears well for its inclusion of
Vaughan’s final factor of organizational offending.
It could be inferred that the Nova Scotia Department of Labour refrained from enforcing
provincial health and safety laws as harshly as is necessitated by those laws due to the
relationship between Westray and the provincial government (Glasbeek and Tucker, 1993, p.
26). Vaughan’s theory suggests that when all of the aforementioned elements of the interaction
between individuals and the organization are present, the chances of corporate misconduct
increase (Payne, 2012, p. 462). It is arguable that these features were indeed present within
Curragh Resources Inc. and that the Department of Labour also may have had a role in the
disaster through its lackluster enforcing of provincial laws.
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Policy Changes
Although the explosion of the Westray mine was catastrophic, it also led way to new
legal developments in the realm of corporate responsibility in situations of workplace harm. The
Canadian government introduced Bill C-45, appropriately dubbed “the Westray bill,” on
November 7, 2003 (Bittle, 2012, p. 4). Resulting from pressures by trade unionists and relatives
of the deceased miners, the Westray bill was produced to “extend liability to both the corporation
and anybody in a supervisory role within the corporation” if they are aware that a crime is being
committed by employees (Johnson, 2008, p. 355). The Westray bill represents the first time the
Canadian government presented amendments to the Criminal Code that included provisions
relating to corporate criminal liability, and the Westray disaster provided an exemplary catalyst
for the government to seriously consider reforms to corporate crime law (Bittle, 2012, p. 4). The
motivation for the Westray bill was found within one of the Westray Mining Inquiry’s 74
recommendations to the Nova Scotia government to prevent the occurrence of a similar incident;
this particular recommendation called for an amendment to the Criminal Code to make corporate
officials accountable for workplace safety (Bittle, 2012, p. 5).
While the Westray bill represents an extensive reform to the Criminal Code by stating the
ways in which an organization may be considered a party to an offence, the government rejected
the entering of “corporate manslaughter” as an official offence into the provision, as well as any
other offence that specifically targets organizations (Clough, 2007, p. 285). Despite its hesitancy
in allocating specific offences to corporate acts, the Westay bill was developed to transform
corporate criminal liability and end the lenient treatment that had been so often awarded to
corporations through its enhanced enforcement mechanisms and firmer penalties (Bittle and
Snider, 2006, p. 471). Additionally, the bill applies not only to corporations, but also to “unions,
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municipalities, partnerships, and other associations of persons”, creating an entirely
revolutionized regime of criminal liability (Archibald, Kenneth, and Roach, 2004, p. 368).
There are theoretical reasons to believe that greater reliance on criminal liability imposed
through the Westray bill may act as a deterrent to prevent corporate negligence and provide
reparation of harm where it occurs, but scholars continue to question whether it will be effective
in this regard (Archibald, Kenneth, and Roach, 2004, p. 369-370; Bittle and Snider, 2006, p.
471). Corporations can arguably find ways to remove themselves from the grips of the law, such
as by declaring bankruptcy in the face of serious criminal charges and invoking certain
protections under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Archibald, Kenneth, and Roach, 2004, p.
369). Additionally, it is important to address the emergence of “professional risk managers”
since the inception of the Westray bill into Canadian law, which are organizations that provide
training and information on the bill to companies to ensure that their practices are not punished
criminally (Bittle, 2012, p. 170). While these businesses may have a legitimate interest in
ensuring workplace safety, the message they employ to corporations is to avoid criminal
responsibility rather than improve the safety of the work environment (Bittle, 2012, p. 176).
Therefore, although the Westray bill is a policy response to the failure of the legal system to
produce convictions in the case of the Westray mine disaster, the legislation is fraught with
loopholes and as long as risk management, not the elimination of risk, is prioritized by
corporations, the bill may have little effect on future cases of corporate negligence.
Conclusion
The Westray mine disaster was a Canadian catastrophe that has sparked legislative
change and thus a new awareness of corporate criminal responsibility in this country. The case
has been analyzed by numerous scholars from a variety of perspectives, and this paper has
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argued that through a review of the literature it is clear that the actions managers at Curragh
Resources Inc., and Department of Labour inspectors constitute acts of corporate violence and
governmental crime respectively. True to the nature of these crimes, the underlying motivations
for violating provincial health and safety regulations in the Westray mine project were arguably
to produce more coal and thus improve the profitability of the corporation; for the government,
the lackluster enforcement of these regulations was related to its desire to see the corporation
bring wealth to the province. Although no criminal convictions were made in the legal
proceedings of this case, the evidence presented by the Westray Mining Inquiry clearly indicates
corporate wrongdoing and governmental oversight in the commission of white-collar crimes.
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